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THE AL-QA'IDA NETWORK AND WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION
By Jonathan Spyer*
The use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) by Middle Eastern terrorist groups is one
of the world's worst nightmares, albeit a more credible one in the aftermath of September
11, 2001. Finding evidence, however, of such groups' plans or efforts in this direction is
difficult. This article assesses the available information on the motives and capabilities of
these organizations, and especially the al-Qa'ida network, to carry out such attacks.
(This article was originally written for a project and conference on "Countering Threats in
the Era of Mass Destruction: Accounts from the Middle East and Europe," co-sponsored
by the GLORIA Center and The Military Centre for Strategic Studies (CeMiSS) of Italy.)
The use of weapons of mass destruction
(WMD) by a terrorist organization is one
of the central threat scenarios currently
facing democracies around the world.
The seriousness of the danger posed by
militant Islamist terror groups has been
apparent since the attacks of September
11, 2001. While evidence has been
unearthed of attempts by a number of
Islamist groups to acquire a non-
conventional capability, (1) it is generally
accepted that the al-Qa'ida network poses
the principle threat regarding the
employment of weapons of mass
destruction by Islamist terrorists. In order
to understand the nature and dimensions
of the threat, arriving at a correct
understanding of the nature of al-Qa'ida--
both in terms of its structure and in terms
of the ideas driving and underlying its
activity--is therefore crucial. Equally
important is the sober analysis of the
available evidence detailing attempts by
the network to obtain a non-conventional
weapons capability, and observation of
the more general patterns of use of WMD
by insurgent and terrorist groups.
To date, the sole clearly documented
example of a terrorist use of WMD
resulting in fatalities was that of the Sarin
gas attack in the Tokyo subway,
perpetrated by the Aum Shinrikyo group
in Japan in 1995.(2) A number of terrorist
groups are considered to have developed
some non-conventional capability, albeit
of a limited and primitive nature. These
include: the Kurdish PKK, which experts
consider to have weaponized Sarin nerve
gas;(3) Hamas, which has coated
fragments placed in bombs with
pesticides and poisons; and a number of
U.S. "Patriot" groups, who have
experimented with various rudimentary
biological devices.(4)
A number of key questions arise in
considering the issue of al-Qa'ida and
WMD: To what extent has it succeeded
in gaining access to the materials
necessary for the preparation of weapons
of mass destruction? To what extent does
it possess the necessary technical
expertise required in the preparation of
such weapons? Which state actors might
be identified as potential or actual sources
of support and assistance in its efforts to
acquire such weapons? How does the use
of such weapons fit in with the strategy
of al-Qa'ida? Finally, why, given the
clear evidence that the network has
invested with some success in efforts to
obtain, for example, a rudimentary
biological capability, have there as yet
been no examples of successful terror
attacks carried out by al-Qa'ida operatives
using WMD?
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
29
Jonathan Spyer
Is it indeed, as Eliza Manningham-
Buller, director of Britain's MI5 put it,
only a "matter of time" before such an
attack takes place?(5) Have measures
taken by Western law enforcement and
intelligence agencies proven sufficient to
foil al-Qa'ida's ambitions in this area? Or,
conversely, has al-Qa'ida deliberately
held back from the employment of such
means of destruction for reasons relating
to the role of terrorist violence in the
network's overall strategy?
name of the new network was taken from
the writings of Azzam (who was killed by
a car bomb in 1989).(9) But the driving
force behind its foundation was bin
Ladin.
For bin Ladin and his closest cohorts,
the Afghan experience is a "founding
myth" whose intensity and central lesson
is best captured in his own words: "Those
who carried out the jihad in Afghanistan
did more than was expected of them
because with very meager capacities they
destroyed the largest military force (the
Soviet Army) and in so doing removed
from our minds this notion of stronger
nations. We believe that America is
weaker than Russia."(10)
The Arab fighters thus drew from their
Afghan experience the conviction that
through strength of will and dedication
their success could be replicated
elsewhere. When bin Ladin returned to
Saudi Arabia in 1989, it was to a hero's
welcome. As a son of one of the
kingdom's wealthiest families, who had
nevertheless freely embraced the role of
mujahid, he was widely seen as
embodying those qualities of militant
piety and incorruptibility which the
kingdom professed itself to uphold.
Bin Ladin rapidly became a key
Islamist opponent to the regime,
however, criticizing its venality and
alleged subordination to the West. His
criticisms notwithstanding, he offered the
support of his fighters to the kingdom
when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in
1990. His offer was rebuffed, and instead,
bin Ladin witnessed the inflow of a large
U.S. force to Saudi Arabia, tasked to
protect the kingdom from invasion. More
than any other, it was this issue of the
American military presence in the Gulf
that formed the focus of bin Ladin's rage
at the West, and set him on the road that
would lead to his later notoriety. As bin
Ladin wrote, "Since God laid down the
Arabian peninsula, created its desert and
surrounded it with its seas, no calamity
has ever befallen it like these Crusader
hosts that have spread in it like locusts,
AL-QA'IDA:
IDEA
AND
ORGANIZATION
The origins of al-Qa'ida as both idea
and organization are to be found in the
units of Arab volunteers that took part in
the war against the USSR in Afghanistan
in the 1980s. Usama bin Ladin, founder
along with the Palestinian Muslim
Brotherhood activist Abdallah Azzam of
the Maktab al-Khalimat (the Afghan
Service Bureau or MAK), was a prime
mover in recruiting and organizing these
fighters.(6) Utilizing his family's wealth,
bin Ladin established training camps for
Arab volunteers, constructed essential
roads and tunnels, contributed large sums
of money, compensated the families of
wounded fighters, and apparently also
personally participated in important
military engagements.(7)
MAK was one of seven recognized
principal mujahideen organizations
involved in the fight against the Soviets.
As such, bin Ladin may have benefited
from aid afforded the mujahedeen by the
CIA at this time.(8) As victory drew near
in the late 1980s, however, bin Ladin and
Azzam parted ways. While Azzam
wished to continue the focus on
Afghanistan, bin Ladin now wanted to
use the Afghan experience and
infrastructure to continue the jihad in
other countries. In 1988, al-Qa'ida al-
sulbah (the solid base) was founded, as an
organizational structure intended to
maintain the links between the "Afghan
Arabs" for further jihad operations after
the conclusion of the Afghan war. The
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Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
The Al-Qa'ida Network and Weapons of Mass Destruction
crowing its soil, eating its fruits and
destroying its verdure."(11)
Bin Ladin's resentment of the Western
military presence in the Hijaz has deep
roots in Islam and Islamic history. An
infidel military presence in the heartland
of Islam--the attacks by Reynold of
Chatillon on Muslim convoys n the
Hijaz--was the precipitating factor in
Salah al-Din's declaration of jihad against
the Crusaders.(12) Bin Ladin sought to
emulate historical precedent by
mobilizing his network of Afghan Arabs.
Increasingly, the focus of his attacks
would be less on the Saudi regime, which
had supposedly failed in its duty by
allowing the infidels into the "land of the
two holy places." Rather, as the 1990s
progressed, bin Ladin's target became the
United States itself, as well as the broader
Western world.
As a result of his declarations and
activities against the Saudi regime, bin
Ladin's Saudi citizenship was revoked in
April 1994 and he was forced to leave the
country. He found a willing host in the
Islamist regime of Umar al-Bashir in
Sudan, to where he repaired with his
family and a large group of followers. In
Sudan, he set about creating an economic
infrastructure which would provide
employment and activity for large
numbers of his Afghan Arabs, many of
whom preferred to continue their lives
within the framework of jihad rather than
return to their countries of origin. His
construction and engineering projects
proved of benefit to the Sudanese
government, in addition to providing
employment for his men. For example, a
bin Ladin company, al-Hijrih for
Construction and Development, was
responsible for building the new airport at
Port Sudan in cooperation with the
Sudanese military.(13)
But bin Ladin's relationship with the
Sudanese regime soured. In 1993, the
country was added by the United States
to the list of states it considered to be
active backers of terrorism. As part of its
efforts to remove itself from this list, the
regime requested in May 1996 that bin
Ladin leave Sudanese soil. The latter
complied with the request, and was able
to set up his base once more in
Afghanistan. (14)
CHANGE AND EVOLUTION IN AL-
QA'IDA
In the course of the 1990s, both al-
Qa'ida's organizational base and the idea
that drove it underwent considerable
change and development. From an
organization whose primary concern had
been the presence of infidel forces in
Saudi Arabia, al-Qa'ida from the mid-
1990s onward began to stress much
broader themes and grievances. Also
from an organization that had been built
around the core of Arab veterans of the
Afghan war, al-Qa'ida began to expand to
form a linking network, bringing together
radical Islamist organizations in many
different parts of the world.(15)
By metamorphosing into a network,
al-Qa'ida became a facilitating element
for carrying out attacks that were planned
and perpetrated by militants who were
not organizationally connected to bin
Ladin in any permanent, hierarchical
structure. To this effect, the network
developed a flexible, multi- faceted
modus operandi, establishing safehouses,
places of residence and training camps in
Afghanistan, Sudan, Pakistan and Yemen
in the course of the 1990s. This
transnational, facilitating role played by
al-Qa'ida was vividly captured in the
testimony before a U.S. court by a former
member of the network, Jamal Ahmad al-
Fadl. (16) One example of al-Qa'ida's role
as a network is its ambiguous part in the
bombing of the World Trade Center in
1993. Investigators believe that bin Ladin
was not personally involved in the
planning of this operation. But Ramzi
Yusef, the central operative involved in
the execution of the attack is thought to
have been linked to Islamist groups
associated with al-Qa'ida in Pakistan and
Afghanistan prior to the bombing. (17)
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
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Jonathan Spyer
Alongside the emerging unique
organizational structure of al-Qa'ida as a
facilitator of Islamic terror worldwide,
the governing idea of al-Qa'ida--that of
global struggle between the forces of
authentic Islam on the one side, and the
West and its corrupt and degenerate
servants on the other, developed
throughout the 1990s. In the course of the
decade, bin Ladin's attacks on the Saudi
regime grew rarer, while the scope of his
attentions expanded.
In a Declaration of War issued in
1996, following his expulsion from
Sudan, he defined the enemy as the
"Zionist-Crusader alliance," before
proceeding to list a long litany of
grievances supposedly suffered by the
Islamic Umma (nation) at the hands of
this alliance.(18) The list included
references to Iraq (where bin Ladin was
opposed to the sanctions regime as
harmful to Muslims), Bosnia, Chechnya,
and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The
first part of the Declaration of War,
nevertheless, still deals with specific
criticisms of the Saudi regime.
By the time of the landmark
declaration of February 23, 1998 (the
Declaration of the World Islamic Front
for Jihad against the Jews and the
Crusaders or
Al-jabhah al-Islamiyya al-
Alamiyah li-qital al-Yahud wal-
Salabayin
), al-Qa'ida's global focus had
become yet more pronounced, but so had
its singling out of the United States as the
force ultimately responsible for the
worldwide attempt to destroy Islam.(19)
The 1998 fatwa confirmed the decision of
the al-Qa'ida network to launch a holy
war, to "glorify the truth and defend
Muslim land," as the document put it.
The document hardly relates at all to the
failings of the Saudi regime, except
regarding the two holy places. The
example of Afghanistan and subsequent
collapse of the Soviet Union was held up
to show how the mujahideen of al-Qa'ida
would succeed in defeating the
apparently much stronge r Americans.
By 1998, the al-Qa'ida network's
umbrella structure, stated goals, and key
leadership cadre had emerged, and they
would retain those characteristics until
the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001.
By that time, the organization was known
to be active in over 20 countries, from
Southeast Asia to North America, and
included Africa, the Middle East, and
Europe. It included militants from a
number of Islamist radical movements,
including the Jama'a al-Islamiyya and al-
Jihad groups from Egypt. The leading
figures of these two groups, Rifat al-Taha
and Dr. Ayman al- Zawahiri, would play
key roles in al-Qa'ida. The disparate
groups and individuals involved in al-
Qa'ida had previously been focused on
replacing the government of a particular
state with an Islamic regime. What
brought them together were the idea of
the Global Jihad and the effective, fluid,
and flexible channels of assistance and
communication created by al-Qa'ida.(20)
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11
Following the loss of its base of
operations after the U.S. attack on
Afghanistan late 2001, and the very
vigorous and largely successful American
pursuit of al-Qa'ida militants over the
next two years, al-Qa'ida's capability to
launch attacks suffered. Senior figures
associated with the organiza tion, such as
Khalid Shaykh Muhammad, one of the
masterminds of September 11, and
"Hambali" (Riduan Isamuddin), leader of
the Jemaa Islamiyya in Southeast Asia,
have been apprehended.
Al-Qa'ida has not been destroyed,
however. Its will to continue attacks is
undiminished. Its abilities, though the
subject of considerable dispute among
experts, remain indisputably
considerable, and may well be growing.
Regarding the experience of al-Qa'ida
since 2001, it might be said that while the
idea survives intact, the organization has
been transformed in the post-September
11 period.(21)
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Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 3 (September 2004)
The Al-Qa'ida Network and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Having lost its physical base and some
high-quality personnel thanks to
determined efforts by Western law
enforcement, intelligence, and armed
forces, al-Qa'ida has searched for and
found new bases of operation. Most
significantly, al-Qa'ida activists are
playing a key role in the insurgency in
Iraq. Of crucial significance, too, is the
return of al-Qa'ida to active militancy in
Saudi Arabia. Other areas of importance,
all of which host their own local Islamist
insurgency, are Mindanao in the
Philippines, the Bangladash-Myanmar
border, Yemen, Somalia, Chechnya, the
Pankishi Valley in Georgia, and of
course, the Afghan-Pakistan border.(22)
Three factors have led to al-Qa'ida's
diminished ability to carry out
spectacular terrorist attacks of the
September 11 type. First, increased
vigilance by law enforcement agencies
and the wider public. One of the best
examples of this was when passengers
foiled the attempted suicide bombing by
Richard Reid of American Airlines flight
63 on December 22, 2001. Second,
September 11 led to greatly increased
cooperation between law enforcement
and intelligence agencies across national
borders. As a result, over 100 attempted
terror attacks by al-Qa'ida have been
intercepted since September 11.(23)
Third, the fact that al-Qa'ida is now being
hunted with the full resources available to
Western law enforcement and
intelligence agencies also inevitably has
an effect. Large-scale acts of terror take a
long time in terms of planning. They
require the participation of a larger
number of individuals and are
characterized by logistical complexity.
Since al-Qa'ida wishes to preserve its
personnel and infrastructure, the logical
choice was to pursue small- and medium-
scale operations, conducted by associate
groups with technical and logistical aid
from the al-Qa'ida network in a process
that has been termed "franchising."
In short, the organization has become
fragmented. Experts consider that in the
period ahead, al-Qa'ida will increasingly
work through the three dozen constituent
Islamist organizations that it has been
helping to train and finance over the last
decade. Among the Islamist groups with
whom al-Qa'ida operatives are today
working closely are Jemmah Islamiya
(Southeast Asian group that carried out
the Bali bombing, with al-Qa'ida experts
assisting), al-Ittihad al-Islami (Horn of
Africa), al-Ansar Mujahidin (Caucasus),
Tunisian Combatants Group, Jayash-e
Mohammad (South Asia), and Salafi
group for Call and Combat (GSPC, active
in North Africa, Europe, and North
America).(24)
This cross-organization cooperation
was the
modus operandi
for the attacks in
Mombasa, Riyadh, Casablanca, Djerba,
and (most probably) at the Marriott Hotel
in Karachi. In so far as operations against
"hard" Western targets have continued,
the toughening of U.S. defenses has led
al-Qa'ida to seek opportunities against
other Western powers. For example,
having failed to target a U.S. warship off
the Yemeni coast, the organization struck
at a French super-tanker in October
2002.(25) The strike on Madrid in March
2004, carried out by a group named after
a bin Ladin aide killed in Afghanistan,
may also be seen as part of this picture,
though its significance goes beyond
it.(26)
The strike in Madrid, coupled with bin
Ladin's subsequent offer of a truce to
Europe, and the intense activity in Iraq
and Saudi Arabia, confirm once more that
al-Qa'ida is a political organization with
clear political aims and belongs in the
category of extreme, violent
revolutionary organizations rather than
apocalyptic, millennialist sects. This is a
matter of much more than semantic
distinction. Millennialist sects, such as
the Japanese Aum group, are convinced
of the imminent intervention of
supernatural forces in the human world.
Often, their violent acts are intended to
bring this event about, or at minimum to
hasten the perceived process. The
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